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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF U I All, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JACK WILKINSON, 
Detaulanl/Appellant 
Case No. 20060904-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Aft && 
STATEM» * >F .lURjsmrTTON 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred in denying Wilkinson's motion to suppress evidence 
,n'ii;iiir I as ;i ii",nil cj ,in ilkj;jl sean.ii anil -,cr IIM, I'ln , ihsur puvscnis a ipiesln'ii i'i law 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Brake "o(U I; 1 95, *\\ 15, 103 P.3d 699. This issue 
was preserved in a motion to suppress (R. 103-97). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of all relevant statutory and constitutional provisions is set forth in the 
Addenda. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Jack Wilkinson appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Fourth District Court after he was convicted by a jury of possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony; and false information, a class C misdemeanor. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Jack Wilkinson was charged by Information filed in Fourth District Court on or 
about February 11, 2005 with possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-98(2)(a)(i), and false information, a class C 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-507(1) (R. 2-1). 
A preliminary hearing was held before Judge Samuel McVey on August 23, 2005 
and Wilkinson was bound over for trial on both charges upon a finding of probable cause 
(R. 81, 208). He was arraigned on September 13, 2005 and pled "not guilty" (R. 210: 3). 
On October 24, 2005 Wilkinson filed a motion to suppress pursuant to the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution, 
alleging that he was unlawfully detained without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
(R. 103-97). An evidentiary hearing was held on the motion on November 29, 2005 and 
the trial court denied the motion (R. 117, 127-23, 209: 46-47). 
A jury trial was held on May 3, 2005 and Wilkinson was convicted of both 
charges (R. 189-88,212). 
On July 10, 2006 Wilkinson was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 0-5 years 
in the Utah State Prison (R. 202-01). 
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On October 2, 2006 a motion to reinstate time to appeal was filed It was granted 
on October 4, 2006, On Septei nbei 21, 2006 a notice of appea .-^ i.i, w An amended 
i lotice :)f appeal \ * as file d on October 30. 2006. ' • • 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
I'estimoiiy from Pi eliminai j • Hearing 
Jeff Plank, a State Bureau of Investigation officer assumed to the Utah County 
Major Crimes Task Force, stopped a vehicle around 12 South and 8th West traveling 35 
who was.Novetta Ann Payne (R. 208: 6, 12). I lie talked and Payne informed Mm her 
driver's license was suspended (R 2^8 V) rAv: was issued n citation HR 208; ]i} The 
two passengers "vv ei e, - - . . : / . -
Wilkinson gave Plank the name of "Bob Wilkinson" and a date of birth of "8-24-57" (R. 
208: 7). Plank learned Wilkinson's true identity when "a K9 deputy (Deputy Williams) 
stopped, and he actually depn 
deployment, after he put his dog back into the car and did indicate on the vehicle on the 
exterior and the interior, put the dog away and made mention to Bob as Jack, and so [he] 
questioned mm ; : . 
He knew him by name" (R. 208: 8). 
Deputy Williams was "in the area" and responded to the scene at Plank's request 
(\< 1()H b J11 "J1!- I'liiik (t ,tilled lluil if :'probabi 
Williams in r<'<<pnm| Imi fluif lit1 "didn't k<rp itiwi n\ if (R. 208. H, 21) On redirect 
3 
Plank was asked by the prosecutor, "[D]id you stop and wait for the K9 search to be done 
or do you just continue right on writing your citation?" (R. 208: 22). Plank answered, 
"Basically I was there writing the citation. I had my dispatch checking on the other 
passengers in the vehicle to see if they had valid driver's licenses, things like that. So, 
several minutes was the time lapse" (R. 208: 22). Plank estimated that the time lapse 
between the stop and when Payne was given the citation was "six, seven minutes, eight 
minutes, something like that" (R. 208: 22). Plank "didn't keep track of [the] times" and 
could only "guess or estimate" (R. 208: 23). Within the first minute of the stop Plank had 
requested a canine unit (R. 208: 23). It likely took a "couple" of minutes for the unit to 
arrive (R. 208: 23). While the dog ran around the car Plank was in his car waiting for 
dispatch to come back with information on the status of the driver (R. 208: 23-24). Plank 
estimated that it probably took a minute for the dog to indicate on the vehicle (R. 208: 
25). 
The purpose of having the canine sniff around the vehicle was for the "ongoing 
investigation11 (R. 208: 13). When asked why he was looking for narcotics, Plank stated, 
"Just an investigation. He was in the area. I had contact with another detective on the 
task force who was a K9 handle, and he was the one that actually sent him over" (R. 208: 
13). Plank was subsequently asked, "But you had no reason to believe there were 
narcotics?" (R. 208: 14). He replied, "Not really, no" (R. 208: 14). 
The dog went around the exterior of the vehicle while the occupants remained 
inside (R. 208: 14). When the dog indicated on the exterior of the driver's side door they 
were asked to get out of the vehicle while the dog went inside (R. 208: 14). No narcotics 
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were found inside the vehicle (R. 208: 14). The dog also hit on the interior of the rear left 
seat where Wilkinson had been sitting (R. 208: 15). Plank testified, "Once the K9 
indicates on the exterior, everyone on the inside is basically subject to search as was the 
interior (R. 208: 15). 
Wilkinson had an outstanding warrant for his arrest and was taken into custody (R. 
208: 6). He was searched and a little blue bag was found in his right pocket (R. 208: 7). 
The bag and its contents were tested by the crime lab and methamphetamine weighing 20 
milligrams was identified (R. 208: 12). A field test at the scene was also performed and 
came back positive for methamphetamine (R. 208: 20). The bag was not tested for 
fingerprints (R. 208: 18). Wilkinson told Plank, "if he would have remembered that the 
bag was in his pocket, he would have gotten rid of i f (R. 208: 16-17). Wilkinson was 
"in custody" when the statement was made but had not been given his Miranda rights (R. 
208: 17). Plank indicated the statement was spontaneous rather than the result of 
questioning (R. 208: 17). Wilkinson had previously been Terry frisked by Plank or 
Burgon and no drugs were located (R. 208: 18). 
There were four officers at the scene: Plank; his partner, Brandon Burgon; 
Williams; and the original K9 officer Plank spoke to, Lane Critser (R. 208: 15-16). 
B. Testimony at Suppression Hearing 
In February of 2005 Novetta Payne was involved in a traffic stop for speeding (R. 
209: 5-6). Jack Wilkinson was the left rear passenger seat and his girlfriend, Janice 
Fusco, was sitting in the front passenger seat (R. 209: 6). The officer approached and 
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Payne immediately informed him she was driving on a suspended driver's license (R. 
209: 7). The officer took her driver's license and returned to his vehicle and "a few 
minutes—maybe 15 minutes later they—a truck pulled up with dogs" (R. 209: 7). She 
thought it was approximately 10 or 15 minutes until the canine unit arrived but she 
wasn't "sure" (R. 209: 7). She testified that it was longer than five minutes (R. 209: 9). 
Payne "was wondering what was taking so long. And one thing I do remember is 
because I was supposed to pick up her boyfriend from work, and I was going to be late. I 
was late because of all this" (R. 209: 9-10). 
Payne used to live with Fusco and that is how she came to know Wilkinson (R. 
209: 10). Prior to the hearing she hadn't seen them in approximately seven months (R. 
209: 10-11). At the time of the stop she saw Fusco almost every day and frequently 
Wilkinson was there in the home they shared with his father (R. 209: 11). She did not 
speak with them about her testimony (R. 209: 12). 
Payne's criminal history includes multiple felony convictions for drug related 
offenses and one false information conviction (R. 209: 13). 
Janice Fusco is Wilkinson's girlfriend and has known him for over a year (R. 209: 
15, 17). In February of 2005 she and Wilkinson were in a vehicle driven by Payne that 
was pulled over for a traffic violation (R. 209: 15-16). Wilkinson was sitting behind 
Payne (R. 209: 16). The officer spoke with Payne then went to his car for about 10 to 15 
minutes" (R. 209: 16). "Just before" the officer came back the canine unit arrived (R. 
209: 16-17). 
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Fusco testified that the officers "checked" all of them and nothing was found on 
any of them (R. 209: 22-23). She indicated that she "can never forget that incident 
because, see, when we were checked, I—one of the officers touched me inappropriately 
and I thought that was very uncomfortable" (R. 209: 22). When the officers checked 
them the next time "from an officer that wasn't even at the scene that arrived there, and 
then there was something on [Wilkinson]. And you know that—that didn't make any 
sense because I thought he didn't have anything on him, I'm positive" (R. 209: 23). She 
saw this officer "take something that wasn't there in the first place" from Wilkinson (R. 
209: 23). She was certain it wasn't there before because "they checked so thoroughly" 
during the earlier search (R. 209: 23). Fusco also testified that they "weren't doing drugs 
at the time. We stopped doing drugs" (R. 209: 23). 
Fusco didn't have any substantive conversations about her testimony with Payne 
or defense counsel (R. 209: 28-29). 
C. Testimony at Trial 
L Testimony of Jeff Plank 
On February 8, 2005 at approximately 8 p.m. Plank stopped an automobile for 
speeding (R. 212: 63, 70). He approached and spoke with the driver, Nobetta Payne (R. 
212: 63). Payne immediately informed him that her driver's license was suspended (R. 
212: 63). Plank "retrieved her information and went back to my vehicle and confirmed 
that it was suspended" (R. 212: 63). 
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He also called Detective Lane Kritzer, a canine handler with the task force, 
approximately a minute into the stop (R. 212: 71, 77). Plank testified that he called 
Kritzer because he'd been running surveillance on a home in Provo and observed a 
vehicle come and leave (R. 212: 72-73). He couldn't remember the make of the vehicle 
or if it was a two-door or four-door he stopped, but he followed the vehicle that left the 
house for 2-3 minutes before stopping it for speeding (R. 212: 73, 97-98). Plank did not 
include this information in his incident report (R. 212: 73). He called the canine unit 
because it's his "job. I do narcotics investigations" (R. 212: 74). Plank acknowledged 
that it was his intent to conduct "a thorough investigation" on the vehicle (R. 212: 76). 
After requesting the canine unit, he went back to the vehicle to try and find out 
who else in the vehicle had a valid driver's license (R. 212: 64, 77-78). He obtained 
names and dates of birth of the passengers, who both indicated their licenses were valid 
(R. 212: 64, 78). Neither passenger had identification with them (R. 212: 64, 78). Plank 
told them that he would go "check and see if you guys have a license on my computer" 
(R. 212: 78). The other passenger indicated her license was out of California so Plank 
"attempted to call California or my dispatch, but they couldn't find any record of it" (R. 
212: 79). 
Wilkinson was the backseat passenger (R. 212: 64). He gave Plank the name of 
"Bob Wilkinson" and a date of birth (R. 212: 65). When Deputy Williams arrived he told 
Plank that it was Jack Wilkinson (R. 212: 66). Plank then ran a warrants check on Jack 
Wilkinson with the date of birth he was subsequently given (R. 212: 66). 
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Deputy Williams arrived on the scene with his canine "a couple of minutes" after 
he was called and deployed his dog while Plank "was writing the traffic citation" (R. 212: 
65, 79). When pressed on cross examination Plank indicated that it was "two to five 
minutes" (R. 212: 81). The dog indicated on the car's driver-side exterior and the 
occupants were told to step out of the vehicle (R. 212: 65, 82-83). All three occupants 
"were searched" (R. 212: 65). 
Plank testified that when Wilkinson was quickly "pat down" for weapons (R. 212: 
66). No bulky objects were found (R. 212: 67). Plank could not remember if he was the 
one to frisk Wilkinson (R. 212: 83). After he was handcuffed and placed under arrest, 
Wilkinson was searched thoroughly and a little blue bag containing a white crystal 
powder was found and pulled out of his right front pocket (R. 212: 67, 89, 91). Plank 
made a rhetorical comment like, "What do we have here?" (R. 212: 69, 92). Plank 
testified that Wilkinson responded with, "if he would have remembered it was there in his 
pocket he would have thrown it away. It had been left in his car by a friend" a couple of 
days ago and he had it in his pocket (R. 212: 69, 94). Plank included this statement in his 
report (R. 212:69). 
Plank testified that had he finished writing the citation before the canine showed 
up the vehicle would have been free to leave (R. 212: 80). He couldn't remember if there 
was anything from a fast food restaurant in the vehicle (R. 212: 202). 
2. Testimony of Brandon Burgen 
Brandon Burgen is an officer assigned to the Utah County Major Crimes Task 
Force (R. 212: 99). On February 8, 2005 he was partnered with Plank and providing 
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surveillance on a drug house where an automobile pulled into the driveway and then left 
again (R. 212: 99-100, 105). It was dark and Burgen could not tell if anyone exited the 
vehicle or went into the house (R. 212: 105). They "waited for a few minutes until it left 
and then started to follow it" (R. 212: 100). The car was speeding so Plank initiated a 
traffic stop (R. 212: 100). Both officers exited their vehicle and Plank spoke with the 
driver (R. 212: 100). Plank got the occupants' information and asked him to run warrants 
and license validity checks (R. 212: 101). One of the names he was given was "Bob 
Wilkinson" but he couldn't find any record when he ran the checks from his vehicle (R. 
212: 101, 108). 
When Williams arrived on the scene he informed them that it was Jack Wilkinson 
(R. 212: 102). Burgen doesn't know how long it took between the initiation of the traffic 
stop and Williams' arrival on the scene (R. 212: 108). Williams ran his canine around the 
car and at some point the occupants were asked to step out of the vehicle (R. 212: 102). 
Burgen did a frisk of the driver (R. 212: 102). 
Some time later Wilkinson was handcuffed and searched by Plank (R. 212: 103). 
Subsequently he was handed a little blue bag taken he assumes from Wilkinson's pocket 
(R. 212: 103, 111). 
3, Testimony ofRhett Williams 
Detective Rhett Williams is employed by the Utah County Sheriffs Office who on 
February 8, 2005 was working as a canine handler (R. 212: 112). That night he was 
called to a scene where Plank and Burgen had made a stop (R. 212: 113). When he got 
the call he was approximately on Center Street in Provo on the west side and it took him 
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a few minutes to get to the scene (R. 212: 113). When he arrived the other officers 
"informed me just what was going on" (R. 212: 113). At their request his dog sniffed the 
exterior of the vehicle and had "indications" on it (R. 212: 113). The occupants were 
taken out of the vehicle as a result of the indication (R. 212: 115). The dog sniffed the 
vehicle's interior and also indicated on it (R. 212: 118). An indication means that an odor 
of drugs is present (R. 212: 119). 
Williams advised Plank and Burgen of Wilkinson's true name (R. 212: 114). 
4. Testimony of Lane Kritzer 
Lane Kritzer is also employed with the Utah County Sheriffs Office and on 
February 8, 2005 was assigned to the task force (R. 212: 130-31). He, too, was a canine 
officer but his dog was imavailable at the time (R. 212: 134). That night he was called to 
assist Plank and arrived on the scene as Williams was putting his dog back in his vehicle 
(R. 212: 131). He was present when a handcuffed Wilkinson was searched by Plank (R. 
212: 132). He saw Plank locate a blue plastic baggie in Wilkinson's right front pocket 
(R. 212: 132, 137). On cross-examination he clarified that his memory as to the exact 
location on Wilkinson that the baggie was found was refreshed by a meeting with the 
other officers on the case (R. 212: 138). Plank asked Wilkinson, "What is this?" or 
something similar (R. 212: 133). Wilkinson responded by indicating that it did not 
belong to him but he had put it in his pocket (R. 212: 133). A meeting with the officers 
involved prior to trial refreshed Kritzer's memory and independent of that meeting he has 
no recollection of Wilkinson's exact response to Plank's question (R. 212: 135, 136). 
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5. Testimony of Kevin Smith 
Kevin Smith is a State Crime Lab employee (R. 212: 122). He tested the contents 
of the bag and found that it contained methamphetamine weighing 20 milligrams (R. 212: 
124-25). He cannot tell if something has been field tested unless it is marked as such (R. 
212: 126). There was no such marking in this case (R. 212: 126). 
6. Testimony of Janice Marie (Fusco) Wilkinson 
Janice Marie Fusco Wilkinson married Jack Wilkinson on April 11, 2006 (R. 212: 
143, 153). She was with him on the night of February 8, 2005 when they were pulled 
over (R. 212: 144). She believes they had just come from Wendy's because his father 
wanted a hamburger (R. 212: 144). She ordered chili (Id.). She didn't have a driver's 
license so they were being driven by Novetta, a friend of hers (R. 212: 145). As they 
were driving back home they were stopped (R. 212: 145). When the stop occurred and 
while they were waiting for the officers to do their work she was eating her chili (R. 212: 
146). She initially gave the officers her sister's name (R. 212: 154). She did not have 
identification on her and only remembers Wilkinson giving a name (R. 212: 159). 
After 10-15 minutes a uniformed officer arrived with dogs (R. 212: 147, 157). He 
knew Jack by name (R. 212: 150). The dog scratched on the driver's side and they were 
asked to get out of the car (R. 212: 148). After the dog finished searching the inside of 
the car they were thoroughly frisked (R. 212: 148-49, 161). Janice felt humiliated and 
uncomfortable with it (R. 212: 149). The officers "patted you down and stuff, and then 
they stick their hands in your pockets and they start looking around" (R. 212: 164). 
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Janice testified that it took more time to frisk Jack "because he had more pockets" (R. 
212: 165). 
Wilkinson was searched again and she watched the officer "pull a bag out from I 
don't know where" and ask something like, "What's this?" (R. 212: 152, 170-71). She 
doesn't recall Jack saying anything in reply, only that he was in shock (R. 212: 171). She 
couldn't believe they found something in the second search when nothing was located in 
the earlier search (R. 212: 153). Janice believes it was the officer who was acquainted 
with Jack who searched him (R. 212: 166). 
At some point the officers asked her "why I was hanging out with people like that" 
meaning Jack and Novetta (R. 212: 147-48). 
7. Testimony of Jack Wilkinson 
On the night of February 8, 2005 Novetta gave Wilkinson and Janice a ride to 
Wendy's (R. 212: 180). On the way back to his dad's house they were pulled over by an 
unmarked car (R. 212: 181). They hadn't stopped anywhere else (R. 212: 181). Officer 
Plank asked Novetta for a driver's license and she indicated to him that she was driving 
on suspension but gave him the insurance and registration information (R. 212: 181). 
Plank went back to his vehicle and then the canine came within five minutes (R. 212: 
181-82). After the canine arrived Plank walked back to the vehicle and "asked our 
names, and I told him, 'Yeah—you know, I'm Bob,' I can't remember. Janice said she 
was Sandra or something or—her sister. Then they run the dog around the car" (R. 212: 
182). 
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The dog jumped up in Novetta's window (R. 212: 182). They were asked to get 
out of the car and the dog was run on the interior of the vehicle (R. 212: 182). Wilkinson 
was told to put his hands on the hood of the unmarked sports utility vehicle (R. 212: 184). 
Then "'the officer—I think it was Plank, he was patting me down. He goes 'What's this?' 
I says, I don't know, a cigarette lighter and a pocketknife and keys or change, you know, 
whatever was in my pocket at the time" (R. 212: 185). He thought it was his right front 
pocket because he's right handed (R. 212: 185). The officer reached in and emptied his 
four pockets on the hood of the car (R. 212: 185-86). Afterwards, Wilkinson returned the 
items to his pockets (R. 212: 185). They didn't check the front coin pocket on his jeans 
the first time (R. 212: 191). Wilkinson testified this was done by "Officer Plank. He 
wasn't in a uniform, though. He was in plain clothes" (R. 212: 185-86). No 
methamphetamine was found during this search (R. 212: 187). 
When the officers found out his real name he was told he was under arrest for a 
warrant (R. 212: 187). He was handcuffed and "then they—he reached in my right front 
pocket (not the coin pocket) and then just pulled out a baggie and says, 'Oh, what do we 
got here?' I didn't see no baggie or nothing, but that's what they said, you know. I 
didn't see nothing, but he says, 'What have we got here?'" (R. 212: 187, 199). Wilkinson 
testified that he responded with, "'What, there's nothing there,'... because I know there 
was nothing. He just emptied my pockets just prior to that, you know" (R. 212: 188). 
Wilkinson denied any knowledge of the baggie to the officer (R. 212: 188). He also said 
something like, "If I would have—if I would have known it was—you know, if I would 
have had that in my pockets I would have gotten rid of it... I had plenty of time to get rid 
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of it" (R. 212: 189). At trial Wilkinson testified he had no knowledge of where the 
methamphetamine came from (R. 212: 189). He was subsequently transported to the jail 
(R. 212: 189). Novetta was allowed to drive with her license on suspension with Janice 
(R. 212: 189). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The request for a canine unit, which prolonged the length and scope of a routine 
traffic stop for speeding, was not justified by reasonable, articulable suspicion and 
therefore violates the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. In addition, all evidence discovered after that unlawful detention must be 
excluded as fruits of the poisonous tree. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING WILKINSON'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens from 
unreasonable seizures. U. S. Const., Amend. IV. "'Stopping an automobile and 
detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure5 within the meaning of [the Fourth] 
Amendment ], even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention 
brief.5" State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, % 28, 63 P.3d 463 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)). To determine whether such a 
traffic stop is reasonable is a two step process: One, "[w]as the police officer's action 
justified at its inception?55 Two, "[w]as the resulting detention reasonably related in 
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scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place?" Hansen, 
2002 UT 125 at If 29; State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994). 
A traffic stop is justified when it is incident to an observed traffic violation. 
Hansen at j^ 30; Lopez at 1132. "[W]hen an officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation, 
he may briefly detain the vehicle and its occupants while he examines the vehicle 
registration and driver's license." State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991) 
(quoting State v. Schlosser, 114 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989). "The length and scope of 
the detention must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered 
its initiation permissible.'" Id (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct 1868, 
1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 905 (1968)). "In justifying the particular intrusion the police 
officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id (quoting 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880). It takes more than an inchoate and 
unparticularized hunch to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard. Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1969). See also, State v. Markland, 2005 UT 
26, H 10, 112P.3d507. 
In this case the car Wilkinson was in was pulled over by Officer Plank for 
speeding 35 miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour zone (R. 208: 5-6). Officer Plank 
testified at the preliminary hearing that he had no reason to believe there was narcotics in 
the vehicle (R. 208: 25). Nonetheless, he called for a canine unit "because it's his job" 
and he intended to conduct a "thorough investigation" on the vehicle (R. 208: 13; 212: 
71, 74, 76). Subsequently the exterior of the vehicle was searched by the dog and when it 
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indicated on the driver's door, the interior was searched, too (R. 208: 13-15; 212: 65, 82-
83). No drugs or contraband were found in the vehicle (R. 208: 14). All three occupants 
of the vehicle, including Wilkinson, were frisked but no contraband was discovered (R. 
208: 18; 209: 22-23). Wilkinson was subsequently handcuffed when an arrest warrant 
was discovered. He was searched again and a little baggie with methamphetamine was 
found in his right front pocket (R. 208: 6-7; 212: 67, 89, 91). 
Wilkinson filed a motion to suppress evidence claiming that Officer Plank's 
request of a canine unit, and the subsequent search by the dog, exceeded the permissible 
scope of the traffic stop for speeding; and that this particular intrusion was not supported 
by specific and articulable suspicion of criminal activity (R. 103-97). After a 
suppression hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R. 127-23). 
In his decision the trial court correctly noted, "the key issue is whether by calling 
for the canine unit the officer extended the detention beyond what was necessary to deal 
with the speeding violation" (R. 126). The trial court went on to conclude that "the 
duration of the stop was not extended by the canine sniff, not even by the few seconds it 
took to call for the dog. The expansion of the investigation to include the drug dog did 
not constitute an illegal extension of the initial stop. The maximum ten minute detention 
for the vehicle and driver for speeding was justified by the ordinary inquiries and citation 
writing necessitated by the traffic violations" (Id.). However, Wilkinson asserts that it is 
not merely a question of time or length but also scope. Johnson, 805 P.2d at 763. 
The trial court based his ruling on the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005), and stated that 
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but for this decision "the result may have been different" because "Utah law provides in 
general that expanding the scope of detention beyond its original purpose without 
reasonable suspicion exceeds the appropriate scope of that detention" (R. 125). 
Furthermore, because the "canine search and traffic investigation were simultaneous" the 
trial court found no distinction between the facts of this case and those of Caballes, 
namely that in Caballes the canine unit arrived on the scene without a request from the 
investigating officer as opposed to this case where Plank actively sought out the canine 
unit. 
In Caballes, police officers stopped a suspect based on probable cause that the 
vehicle was speeding. 834 S.Ct. at 836-37. The investigating officer radioed dispatch to 
report the stop and a second trooper overheard the transmission and immediately went to 
the scene with his narcotics-detection dog. Id. at 836. The defendant was detained for 
approximately ten minutes while one officer wrote him a warning citation and the second 
officer walked the dog around the car. Id The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the 
denial of the motion to suppress because the canine sniff was performed without specific, 
articulable facts to suggest drug activity and thus unjustifiably enlarged the scope of the 
routine traffic stop. Id at 836-37. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on 
the question: "Whether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion 
to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop." 
Id at 837. The Court went on to state that official conduct that does not compromise 
legitimate privacy interests is not subject to the Fourth Amendment, and that there is no 
legitimate interest in possessing contraband. Id at 837. "Accordingly, the use of a well-
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trained narcotics-detection dog... during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not 
implicate legitimate privacy interests." Id. at 838. 
However, in reaching its holding the Court noted, "A seizure that is justified solely 
by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is 
prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission." Caballes, 834 
S.Ct. at 837. Because the state courts had carefully reviewed whether the investigating 
officer "had improperly extended the duration of the stop to enable the dog sniff to 
occur," the Court accepted "the state court's conclusion that the duration of the stop in 
this case was entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to 
such a stop." Id. 
Wilkinson asserts that the facts in this case are sufficiently distinguishable to 
Caballes to require a different result. In Caballes the length and scope of the stop was 
not prolonged whatsoever by the dog sniff. The investigating officer did not request the 
canine unit and in no way participated in the activities surrounding the dog sniff. 
Another officer overheard the investigating officer's dispatch and voluntarily reported to 
the scene. The investigating officer simply went about his business of writing the 
warning ticket while the second officer ran the dog around the vehicle. 
In this case, however, Officer Plank, as noted by the trial court, "actively 
requested assistance from the canine unit" (R. 124; 208: 13, 21-22; 212: 74). Moreover, 
it was his stated intent to conduct a "thorough" narcotics investigation on the vehicle and 
its occupants in spite of the fact that he had no reason to suspect drug activity (R. 208: 
14; 212: 76). He called for the canine unit approximately a minute into the stop (R. 212: 
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71, 77). In addition, Detective Williams, the canine officer who reported to the scene, 
testified that when he arrived at the scene he was informed about what was "going on" 
(R. 212: 113). 
The trial court's conclusion that the "duration of the stop was not extended by the 
canine sniff, not even by the few seconds it took to call for the dog" (R. 125) is 
erroneous. First of all, his conclusion that the call only took "a few seconds" is not 
supported by the factual record. Wilkinson asserts it is unclear how long the call took. 
Moreover, the call did not take place while waiting for any information from dispatch. 
The call was placed during the first minute or so of the stop because Plank was intent on 
conducting a thorough narcotics investigation despite having no reasonable suspicion of 
drug activity. In addition, once Williams arrived it took an unspecified amount of time 
for him to be informed by the investigating officers of what was "going on." Therefore, 
unlike Caballes, the justified seizure for speeding became unlawful because it was 
prolonged by the investigating officers' active pursuit of a thorough narcotics 
investigation. And clearly, not being subjected to unlawful detentions is a legitimate 
interest protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
Because of the significant factual differences in this case, Caballes is not 
applicable here. See, cf, United States v. Ladeaux, 454 F.3d 1107, n.3 (10th Cir. 2006) 
("In Caballes, the Supreme Court held that the use of a dog-sniff during a lawful traffic 
stop is not unconstitutional where the sniff does not extend the length of the detention.... 
The salient difference between Caballes and this case, however, is that there was no order 
in Caballes comparable to Chatfield's request directed at the occupants of the vehicle in 
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this case. Ladeaux objects not to the dog-sniff, but rather to the request; Caballes simply 
does not reach this question.") Therefore, traditional Fourth Amendment analysis 
applies. The investigating officers in this case, by their own admission, had no "specific, 
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warranted]" turning a traffic stop for speeding into a "thorough" 
investigation for drug activity, and the lawful traffic stop became an unlawful detention. 
Johnson, 805 P.2d at 763 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880). 
Accordingly, because of the Fourth Amendment violation all evidence obtained as 
a result of that violation must be suppressed. "Evidence obtained by police exploitation 
of a prior illegality is tainted by the violation of a person's constitutional rights." 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at ^ 62 (citations omitted). The purpose of excluding such 
evidence is to "compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively 
available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 
590, 599-600, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 Led.2d 416 (1975) (citation omitted). See also Hansen 
at 1f 62. Here the purpose of the illegal conduct was to conduct a search of the vehicle 
and subsequently Wilkinson's person. Suppressing the evidence clearly will have the 
desired deterrent effect. Moreover, there were not intervening factors that would mitigate 
the illegality. Lastly there was no significant lapse in time between the initial illegal 
detention and the searches of his car and person. Hansen at fflf 64-69. Therefore, he 
asserts that exclusion of all evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful seizure and 
detention must be suppressed. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Wilkinson requests that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress, vacate his conviction, and remand this case to the Fourth District Court for 
further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of August, 2007. 
Margaret P.<£mdsa; 
Counsel for Appellant 
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22 
ADDENDA 
23 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C< 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
tfiZh 1"aicmUlstm Cou« 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
DEC 0 2t)Q5
 nAA> 
-Deputy 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK WILKINSON, JR., 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
Case No. 051400711 
Date: December 8,2005 
Judge Samuel D. McVey 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress came befoie the court on November 29, 2005. Curtis 
Larson, Esq., appeared for the State and Deborah Hill, Esq., appeared for the defense. The 
parties stipulated to use of the preliminary hearing transcript and also presented other testimony 
at the hearing. After careful consideration of the evidence and the memoranda and arguments of 
counsel, the Court enters its Order Denying the Motion to Suppress. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On February 8, 2005, Officer Jeff Plank stopped a speeding vehicle. Defendant was 
a passenger in the vehicle. He was in the backseat behind the driver. Another passenger sat on 
the passenger's side in the front. . 
2. Officer Plank approached the driver who immediately informed him she had a 
suspended license. Officer Plank got her name as well as the names of defendant and the other 
passenger. He returned to his unmarked vehicle to write a citation and run all of the names for 
valid licenses. Here, the Court makes a presumption his reason for running the passengers' 
names was to determine whether they could drive if the driver was disqualified from doing so. 
3. Before writing a citation and calling information into dispatch, and immediately 
upon his return to his police car, Officer Plank requested over the radio that a canine unit come 
to the scene. He made the request to another detective. 
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4. It took approximately two minutes for the canine unit to arrive. Upon arrival, the 
handler ran the dog around the car in which defendant was sitting and it alerted on the driver's 
side. This process took about two minutes. 
5. The entire time defendant was at the scene before the canine finished its sniff of the 
vehicle was six to ten minutes. During this six to ten-minute time frame, Officer Plank was 
working continuously on the speeding citation and waiting for a call back from dispatch on the 
status of the driver's license, with the exception of the few seconds it took to call for the dog 
when he first returned to his car. 
6. The canine alerted on the driver side of the vehicle at which point the officer, and 
other officers who had then arrived, had defendant and the others step out of the car. Officers 
subsequently located methamphetamine on defendant's person. Defendant was arrested on an 
outstanding warrant. 
DISCUSSION 
Defendant moved to suppress the results of the search on Mr. Wilkinson by claiming the 
Officer was unjustified in detaining the vehicle which Mr. Wilkinson was a passenger for the 
canine search. Initially, the Court notes it does not address whether Officer Plank actually 
detained defendant himself before the dog arrived. The parties did no raise this issue. 
(Admittedly, as a passenger in the car on a cold winter day defendant may have had little 
incentive to get out of the car and walk home. However, there was no evidence of anyone being 
detained except the driver. The Officer merely asked defendant what his name was (defendant 
gave a wrong first name).) 
Defendant argues the encounter between Officer Plank and defendant amounted to a level 
two detention and Officer Plank unlawfully extended the scope of the detention by requesting the 
canine unit during a traffic stop involving only speeding and driving on suspension, with no 
suspicion of drug activity. Regarding this argument the key issue is whether by calling for the 
canine unit the officer extended the detention beyond what was necessary to deal with the 
speeding violation. Accordingly, the time taken for the stop and the activities of the officer are 
key factors bearing on the defense's claim. (Defendant conceded on his other argument 
contending a lack of post-dog sniff reasonable suspicion.) 
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At the evidentiary hearing on this matter the witnesses disagreed over the time taken for 
the stop. Officer Plank stated that from the time he stopped the vehicle to the time he gave the 
driver the citation(after the dog ran around the car) it took approximately "six, seven, eight 
minutes, something like that." (Prelim. Transcript at 22). He estimated it took one minute to 
conduct the initial stop, speak with the vehicle occupants, go back to his unit and call for the 
canine. The canine arrived in about two minutes. It then took two minutes for the dog to search 
the exterior of the vehicle. Further, he stated he was continuously writing his citation and 
continuing his investigation for the speeding and driver's license, violations during the time the 
dog arrived and ran around the car. He was also waiting for dispatch to call back with 
information on the status of the driver. Thus, he did not detain the car for longer than the time 
ordinarily required to investigate and cite the speeding and suspended license violations. (See, 
M a t 23-24). 
On the other hand, the driver and other passenger testified they estimated the time of the 
stop at fifteen minutes, although it could have been ten. They remembered sitting in the car for a 
long time before the dog arrived. 
Given the discrepancy in testimony and the fact no dispatch logs were presented, but 
weighing the credibility of the witnesses, the Court determines six to ten minutes elapsed from 
the time the vehicle stopped until the canine finished running around the car. However, during 
that six to ten minutes, Officer Plank was actively working on his citation and waiting for 
information to arrive from dispatch on the suspended driver's license. Accordingly, the duration 
of the stop was not extended by the canine sniff, not even by the few seconds it took to call for 
the dog. The expansion of the investigation to include the drug dog did not constitute an illegal 
extension of the initial stop. The maximum ten minute detention of the vehicle and driver for 
speeding was justified by the ordinary inquiries and citation writing necessitated by the traffic 
violations. 
Admittedly, the result may have been different were it not for the recent United States 
Supreme Court decision in Illinois v. Caballes, 534 U.S. _ , 125 S.Ct 824 (2005). Utah law 
provides in general that expanding the scope of detention beyond its original purpose without 
reasonable suspicion exceeds the appropriate scope of that detention. 
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We can find no authority supporting an abandonment of the rule requiring that any 
further detention or investigation, beyond what is necessary to control the scene, 
be '"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference 
in the first place.'" Chapman, 921 P.2d at 450 (quoting Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 9, 88 S. Ct. at 1878-79)). Support for this position can 
be found in State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991), where the Utah Supreme 
Court "held that running a warrants check on a passenger in an automobile that 
had been properly stopped exceeded the appropriate scope of detention." 
Chapman, 921 P.2d at 453 (emphasis omitted) (citing Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764). 
Thus, even a "minimal intrusion" requires the police officer to provide a basis for 
the action. . . . 
State v. Valdez, 2003 UTApp. 100, para.20, 68 P.3d 1052, 1058-59. Notwithstanding this 
statement of Utah law, Illinois v. Caballes provides that using a narcotics detection dog during a 
lawful traffic stop does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy and is thus not subject 
to the Fourth Amendment. Caballes, supra, 524 U.S. at , 125 S.Ct. at 858. The Caballes court 
reversed an Illinois Supreme Court holding that use of the dog "unjustifiably enlarg[ed] the scope 
of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation." Id. at 836-37. 
Defendant seeks to distinguish Caballes from the instant case noting that in Caballes the 
canine unit simply arrived on the scene without a request from the investigating officer whereas 
in the instant case Officer Plank actively requested assistance from the canine unit. This is 
certainly a well-thought-out argument. Given the fact, however, that Officer Plank did not hold 
the car longer than necessary to complete the speeding and suspended license investigation nor 
hold it at any time for the sole purpose of having a canine unit arrive, the Court does not believe 
the distinction compelling in this case. The canine search and traffic investigation were 
simultaneous. 
// 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Suppress is denied. 
DATED this 1 day December, 2005. 
BY THE COURT 
«£££& 
SAMUEL D. M 
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